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ABSTRACT
A common application of security analytics is binary classification problems, which are
typically assessed using measures derived from signal detection theory, such as accuracy,
sensitivity, and specificity. However, these measures fail to incorporate the uncertainty inherent
to many contexts into the results. We propose that the types of binary classification problems
studied by security researchers can be described based on the level of uncertainty present in the
data. We demonstrate the use of Bayes data analysis in security contexts with varying levels of
uncertainty and conclude that Bayesian analysis is particularly relevant in applications
characterized by high uncertainty. We discuss how to apply similar analyses to other information
security research.
Keywords: Binary classification, security, Bayesian analysis, uncertainty, prevalence, positive
predictive value
INTRODUCTION
The information security field contains many binary classification problems such as
insurance fraud detection (Artís et al. 2002), finding security bugs (Jiang et al. 2020), intrusion
detection (Li et al. 2020), and management fraud detection (Cecchini et al. 2010). Shaukat and
colleagues (Shaukat et al. 2020) recently compared eighteen review papers related to the use of
machine learning techniques in cybersecurity. The base rate in the samples, the size of the
1
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sample, the prevalence of cases in the population, and the sensitivity and specificity of the test all
contribute to varying levels of uncertainty in the contexts above. In this paper, we use Bayesian
data analysis methods to show how this uncertainty impacts results and recommend when
incorporating Bayesian data analysis is most useful to decision makers.
Evaluating Classification Problems
In most security research using binary classification, classification models are evaluated
using signal detection measures such as accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, precision, F-score, and
area under the ROC curve (AUC) as defined in Table 1 (Japkowicz and Shah 2011; Shaukat et
al. 2020) derived from a confusion matrix (see Table 2). These measures are useful both to
Table 1: Definitions of common classification measures.

Measure

Formula

Description

Sensitivity, Recall, Hit Rate,
True Positive Rate (TPR):

Of all class A’s, the fraction labeled
class A

Specificity, True Negative
Rate (TNR):

Of all class B’s, the fraction labeled
class B

Precision, Positive
Predictive Value (PPV):

The posterior probability of a case
labeled class A being class A

Negative Predictive Value
(NPV):

The posterior probability of a case
labeled class B being class B

Accuracy:

Of all cases, the fraction correctly
labeled
Average of sensitivity and precision

F1:

AUC:

Area under the ROC curve

compare classification models and aid decision-makers (Green and Swets 1966). AUC, for
example, provides a measurement that incorporates the accuracy of a model at every possible
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threshold or output probability of that model. This, however, is best used for comparing models
rather than determining the model’s usefulness. For exploratory studies on new topics or
techniques, the measures above provide an adequate baseline for future research. For evaluating
how detection systems might work in the field, however, these measures may fall short.
Table 2: Confusion Matrix

True Class: A
True Class: B

Classified as: A*
True Positives (TP)
False Positive (FP)

Classified as: B
False Negative (FN)
True Negative (TN)

Note: Here we assume class A is the class of most interest to the researcher.
Uncertainty refers to a lack of complete information that prevents perfect decision
making (Twitchell and Fuller 2018). The lack of information, or uncertainty, may lead to
overconfidence in results both by expressing unsupported precision and failing to recognize the
full range of possibilities. For example, neither sensitivity nor specificity (as defined in Table 2)
incorporate any information about the prevalence, or proportion of the population represented by
the class of most interest. (Note that we refer to “prevalence” to mean the percentage of a
population with the phenomenon being detected. We will use “base rate” to refer to the number
of positive cases in the sample used in the study).
Researchers frequently build classification models on balanced samples to overcome the
inherent problems of training a model on a low base rate sample. While this is a well-justified
strategy, results should also be evaluated with respect to the prevalence. When results are
evaluated in relation to the prevalence, sensitivity may be unacceptably low or the false positive
rate too high for the model to have practical value (Twitchell and Fuller 2018;

National

Research Council, 2003). ROC curves, AUC and F-score are frequently reported, but are less
useful for analyzing performance in specific scenarios or contexts than they are for comparing
algorithms. Precision, or the proportion of positive identifications that are correct, does
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incorporate the sample’s base rate, but does not help the user understand the uncertainty about
the base rate and is often not representative of the true prevalence (Twitchell and Fuller 2018).
These signal detection measures are point estimates that tell us how a classifier performs on the
sample data. They do not tell us how well a classifier might perform on future data, nor do they
incorporate any uncertainty in the data. To achieve its full potential, analytics research should
more fully evaluate the results in the intended context.
Bayesian Data Analysis
Bayesian data analysis methods are well-suited for understanding the type of uncertainty
we describe above. Unlike frequentist methods, they do not assume a sampling distribution.
Instead, they require building a full probability model on all parameters and allow sampling from
the posterior distribution of this model. The posterior distribution is not assumed to have any
shape and includes uncertainty about all parameters in the model including any prior uncertainty
we have about any of the parameters.
Bayesian data analysis goes beyond a simple application of Bayes’ theorem. A wellknown application of Bayes’ theorem is calculating the probability of having a disease given a
positive diagnostic test. In this application, a positive result from a diagnostic test with 99%
accuracy when testing for a disease with a 1% prevalence in the general population yields a
probability of having the disease of approximately 50% (Horgan 2016). Missing from this
analysis is sources of uncertainty related to the accuracy of the test or related to the prevalence of
the disease. The specificity and sensitivity of the test and the prevalence of the disease are all
subject to measurement error and bias from the contexts in which those measurements were
taken. Finally, the more uncertain the test, the more influence the prevalence has on the test
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precision. A very uncertain test combined with a very low prevalence results in a precision not
much different than the prevalence.
Modern Bayesian data analysis—as described in extensive detail in (Gelman et al.
2013)—encourages researchers to include these errors as uncertainty in the analysis by working
with probability distributions rather than point estimates. At its essence, Bayesian data analysis
requires describing a prior distribution of all applicable parameters before incorporating the data
and a likelihood distribution of the data. Multiplying them together and dividing by the data
distribution (i.e., applying Bayes’ theorem to the probability distributions) results in a joint
posterior distribution of all the parameters. In many applications, this procedure can’t be done by
exact computation (Geyer 2011), so current methods employ Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC), an approximate, probability-based, numerical method to sample directly from the
posterior distribution. Descriptive statistics can then be derived from the sample to summarize
the posterior distribution and make inferences. In the next section, we illustrate the use of
Bayesian data analysis with examples from information security.
METHODOLOGY
While Bayesian data analysis is becoming more commonly used in the medical field
(Gelman and Carpenter 2020), it has only recently appeared in IS research and behavioral
business research (Cecchini et al. 2010; Dutta et al. 2018; Twitchell and Fuller 2018). To
demonstrate the utility of incorporating Bayesian data analysis into security analytics research,
we identified several studies, shown in Table 3, that use binary classification models to find
phenomena of interest such as cases of fraud, bugs, and deception. These studies, unlike many
others, provided a full confusion matrix and prevalence estimates. Many studies don’t provide
prevalence, likely because it is difficult to obtain or the study authors decided it wasn’t
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important. Prevalence (Prev. in Table 3) is the estimated prevalence of the phenomenon being
detected in a real-world setting, not the prevalence of the sample used to train or test the model.
Prevalence n (Prev. n in Table 3) is the size of the real-world population used to determine
prevalence. Sample size is the size of the testing set used to test the detection method in the
study.
Table 3. Studies included along with reported results

Study

TP

FP

TN

FN

Sample Prev. Prev. n
Size

Insurance Fraud (Artís et al. 2002)

768

290 708

229

1995

Security bugs (Jiang et al. 2020)

107

8

16,917 3,938 20970

0.038 138,982

Criminal Statements (Fuller et al. 2009)

63

93

194

0.216 366

Intrusion Detection (Li et al. 2020)

137,884 53

85,070 4,299 227306 0.001 2,830,540

Credit Card Fraud (Arya and G 2020)

99

40

56,821 2

56962

0.002 284,807

Data Loss Prevention (Faiz et al. 2020)

135

28

2,159

114

2436

0.105 8,117

Management Fraud (Cecchini et al. 2010)

20

92

890

5

1007

0.032 6,427

Crowdfunding Fraud (Siering et al. 2016)

288

38

232

94

652

0.007 44,054

16

366

0.333 3

The studies we found in the security literature did not attempt to estimate prevalence from a
field test. Instead, if they reported any prevalence, they reported it as a feature of their sample or
the population from which the sample was drawn. For example, in the criminal statements data,
the sample the study used had a base rate of 79 deceptive statements out of 366 total statements.
Since the base rate is given, we include the prevalence estimate as a prior instead of estimating it
as part of the likelihood. Another example is the intrusion detection study (Li et al. 2020) which
only provided the prevalence of its training set. The prevalence did not reflect the real-world
ratio of true positives to overall number of cases. So, we used the closer-to-real-world prevalence
found in the CICIDS2017 data set (Panigrahi and Borah 2018). We used Model 1 in the
appendix to analyze the studies. We translated this model into the Stan probabilistic
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programming language (Carpenter et al. 2017) for fitting via MCMC. The code for the model is
linked in the appendix.
RESULTS
The sensitivity, specificity and prevalence of these studies are summarized in Table 4, along
with the credible intervals (CrI) for each. Because the results of the model are posterior
distributions that may not be normally distributed, we follow (Edwards et al. 1963) and use
credible interval to indicate the interval which contains 95% of the probability density starting
from the 2.5% quantile and ending at the 97.5% quantile. We abbreviate this CrI to distinguish it
from confidence intervals used in frequentist statistics. While insurance fraud and management
fraud have similar sensitivity levels, management fraud has a much wider credible interval and
thus less certain results than those for insurance fraud. We further investigate the impact of
prevalence through its influence on positive predictive value (PPV), as shown in Table 5.
Table 4. Summary statistics for the model posterior distribution

Study

Model Sens. μ (95%
CrI)

Model Spec. μ (95%
CrI)

Model Prev. μ (95%
CrI)

Insurance Fraud

0.770 (0.746, 0.793)

0.709 (0.684, 0.733)

0.394 (0.070, 0.801)

Security Bugs

0.026 (0.023, 0.030)

0.999 (0.999, 1.000)

0.038 (0.037, 0.039)

Criminal Statements

0.791 (0.704, 0.870)

0.675 (0.631, 0.717)

0.217 (0.176, 0.261)

Intrusion Detection

0.970 (0.969, 0.971)

0.999 (0.999, 1.000)

0.001 (0.001, 0.001)

Credit Card Fraud

0.971 (0.931, 0.994)

0.999 (0.999, 0.999)

0.002 (0.002, 0.002)

Data Loss Prevention

0.542 (0.489, 0.593)

0.987 (0.982, 0.991)

0.105 (0.098, 0.112)

Management Fraud

0.779 (0.611, 0.910)

0.906 (0.892, 0.919)

0.032 (0.028, 0.037)

Crowdfunding Fraud

0.753 (0.714, 0.789)

0.857 (0.816, 0.894)

0.007 (0.007, 0.008)

Table 5 shows the PPV of each study. We focus on PPV as the model output of interest since
detection is focused on finding “positive” cases and PPV provides the probability that a case
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labeled as positive is actually positive. Additionally, we highlight PPV uncertainty to show how
accuracy, prevalence, and sample size affect result in differing levels of uncertainty. Though we
view uncertainty as a spectrum, to facilitate description, we describe three broad categories of
uncertainty: high, medium, and low, and have labeled our results accordingly in We use these
categories to frame the discussion below.
Table 5. Summary statistics for the model posterior distribution of NPV and PPV

Study

NPV μ (95% CrI)

PPV μ (95% CrI)

PPV Uncertainty Level

Insurance Fraud

0.800 (0.436, 0.976)

0.594 (0.167, 0.916)

high

Security Bugs

0.963 (0.962, 0.964)

0.672 (0.524, 0.816)

high

Criminal Statements

0.921 (0.881, 0.954)

0.402 (0.330, 0.477)

medium

Intrusion Detection

1.000 (1.000, 1.000)

0.517 (0.453, 0.586)

medium

Credit Card Fraud

1.000 (1.000, 1.000)

0.701 (0.642, 0.761)

medium

Data Loss Prevention

0.948 (0.942, 0.955)

0.829 (0.772, 0.879)

low

Management Fraud

0.992 (0.986, 0.997)

0.215 (0.165, 0.264)

low

Crowdfunding Fraud

0.998 (0.997, 0.998)

0.039 (0.029, 0.052)

low

High Uncertainty
The Insurance Fraud study (Artís et al. 2002) illustrates a PPV with high uncertainty. Even
though the sensitivity and specificity seem good at 0.77, PPV is very uncertain with a mean of
0.594 and a 95% CrI that spans from 0.167 to 0.914. This high uncertainty stems from the
prevalence. To determine the prior prevalence of fraudulent claims, the researchers asked the
company’s claim inspectors for an estimate, which they gave as 1/3 of all claims. We entered this
into the model as priorpos = 1 and priorneg = 2. The resulting beta distribution is very wide, which
results in the PPV also being very wide. The PPV is much lower than the sensitivity or
specificity.
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The Security Bugs (Jiang et al. 2020) study’s PPV also has high uncertainty. This is despite
its very certain sensitivity, in terms of credible interval (95% CrI: 0.023–0.030), specificity (95%
CrI: 0.999–1.000), and prevalence (95% CrI: 0.37–0.39), which are a result of the high sample
size. Despite the low uncertainty in these measures, the PPV has a high uncertainty, which
results from the low accuracy due to low sensitivity (μ: 0.026). Calculating the raw PPV from the
sample confusion matrix results in 107/(107 + 8) = 0.930, but incorporating the prevalence
reported in the paper of 0.038 rather than the sample base rate of 0.193 and using a probabilistic
model shows that this point estimate is misleading. Instead, Model 1 predicts a PPV with a mean
of 0.672 whose 95% CrI stretches from 0.524 to 0.816. In situations of high uncertainty, results
must be applied with caution.
Medium Uncertainty
The Criminal Statements, Intrusion Detection, and Credit Card Fraud studies all have PPVs
of medium uncertainty. All three have more narrow intervals than the high uncertainty studies,
with Criminal Statements having a 95% CrI that spans from 0.330 to 0.477, Intrusion Detection
having a 95 % CrI between 0.453 and 0.586, and Credit Card Fraud having a 95% CrI that
ranges from 0.642 to 0.762. Even in the medium uncertainty category, the prevalence can have a
large effect on the PPV. Criminal Statements and Credit Card Statements are heavily influenced
by the prevalence. Criminal Statements has a sensitivity of 0.797 but has a much lower mean
PPV (0.402). Similarly, Credit Card Fraud has a high sample sensitivity of 99/101, but, because
of its very low prior prevalence of 492/284807 (0.002), a much lower model mean PPV of 0.632
than the sensitivity alone would imply.
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Low Uncertainty

The studies with the most certain PPVs include Data Loss Prevention, Management Fraud,
and Crowdfunding Fraud. Of these, Crowdfunding fraud is the most certain with its certainty
resulting from a very low and certain model prevalence of 0.007 (95% CrI: 0.029–0.052). This
prevalence results in a very low PPV of 0.039. The low PPV itself also drives its certainty. The
model assumes a binomial distribution for the PPV; therefore, the PPV distribution can’t be
lower than zero. As the distribution gets closer to zero or one it gets narrower since there isn’t
room for it to spread out without crossing zero or one. In low uncertainty contexts, the usefulness
of signal detection measures is not greatly enhanced by incorporating results from Bayesian
analysis.
DISCUSSION
In this research, we have shown that including prevalence and uncertainty in addition to
standard performance measures may better provide researchers and practitioners the information
they need to evaluate the utility of binary classification models. We see credible intervals
indicating high uncertainty in the Insurance Fraud (Artís et al. 2002) and Security Bugs (Jiang et
al. 2020) studies with 95% credible intervals of 75 and 28 percentage points, respectively. In
both studies, what might look like reasonable accuracies when looking at point estimates become
much less useful when uncertainty is included.
These high uncertainty estimates are dramatic, but estimating uncertainty is also useful when
it is medium and low. First, without estimating uncertainty we can’t know whether it is high,
medium, or low. Second, in some contexts where the impact of misclassification is high. even
what we labeled medium or low uncertainty in this paper may be too uncertain to be useful.
Security researchers can estimate prevalence and then use that prevalence to demonstrate the
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usefulness of the detection method using PPV and NPV. Even when prevalence is only crudely
estimated as demonstrated by the “one-third” estimate in the Insurance Fraud (Artís et al. 2002)
study, researchers can still use that information to estimate include prevalence.
Despite prior relevant studies not incorporating uncertainty and prevalence, they still add
value to the field. We see these previous studies and the current paper’s contributions as points
along a line of maturation. In the past, reporting accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, and precision
from sample data were considered sufficient to understand a binary classification problem. Many
studies have gone beyond this by reporting ROC curves and AUC. This paper furthers this
process of maturation by including uncertainty to enable assessment of their practical
application.
Recommendations for researchers
We recommend researchers estimate the amount of uncertainty in their models when
performing security analytics research. They can then know whether their research has low,
medium, or high uncertainty. When uncertainty is low, reporting point estimates and indicating
that uncertainty was tested and is low should be sufficient. When uncertainty is high, however,
we recommend researchers include measures and visualizations of that uncertainty. We also
recommend researchers temper their conclusions based on the measures of uncertainty. If, for
example, the PPV of a detection mechanism has a wide credible interval, basing conclusions on
the mean PPV would be inappropriate if the low or high end of the credible interval would lead
to a different conclusion. When uncertainty falls in the medium category, researchers should
report it, but how much it affects the conclusions or how much emphasis they should put on the
uncertainty depends on the context. In contexts like credit card fraud (where banks assume the
cost of a certain amount of fraud) some uncertainty may not have much consequence: the bank
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would do the same thing whether the result was at the high or low end of the credible interval. In
contexts with higher stakes such as security intrusions in critical infrastructure, results at
different ends of the credible interval may change which security measure are put in place.
To fully estimate uncertainty researchers must estimate the prevalence the phenomenon of
interest for their detection mechanism. In our extensive search for relevant studies that included
prevalence we only found 13 (8 of which we included as exemplars) out of several hundred
candidates. As the studies above show, without an estimate of prevalence it is impossible to
know the level of uncertainty in PPV. We recommend researchers include some estimate of
prevalence, even if that estimate is crude.
Limitations and Future Directions

Future studies should incorporate a larger variety of data sets to obtain a more comprehensive
view of uncertainty in detection studies across the security literature. Using more samples will
allow researchers to explore the issue of context dependency and incorporate a wider variety of
prevalences more fully. Though we have demonstrated the impact of Bayesian data analysis
across multiple studies and contexts (and provide additional results through the link in the
appendix), we were restricted by the number of studies that provided sufficient information to
conduct the analysis. The description of the samples used to train and test models is also
inconsistent, preventing reproducibility of their results and more extended performance
evaluation. We recommend that researchers include a confusion matrix and as mentioned above
prevalence (known or estimated) for their data in the context of interest, if the prevalence is
different than the sample base rate.
The Bayesian data analysis presented in this paper may not be appropriate for every study.
For example, studies that are simply comparing the performance of various classification
algorithms (Lessmann et al. 2015) or determining important classification features (Ho et al.
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2016), prevalence and PPV may be less of a priority. It may also be beyond the scope of
exploratory research. However, we advocate for including measures that could enable this
analysis as research in a context accumulates. Reviewers and editors should also encourage
publishing data and a consistent set of metrics. We have also shown that Bayesian data analysis
may be less useful where the researcher can establish that their context and sample is one of low
uncertainty.
CONCLUSION

This paper shows how Bayesian analysis can be used to better understand studies that use
machine learning for security tasks. It demonstrates that studies that use machine learning may
that expressing uncertainty in these studies provides a better measure of their usefulness. More
specifically, it shows that incorporating Bayes data analysis techniques, specifically prevalence
and PPV, provides a clearer view of a detection method’s certainty and therefore usefulness.
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APPENDIX
Model 1.

Where y is the number people who tested positive, which is distributed binomially according
to n, the number of tests, and p the rate of positives for the test. p is the true-positive rate (i.e.,
the sensitivity, sens) plus the false-positive rate (i.e., fpr or 1 minus the specificity). These are
multiplied by the prevalence, prev. The model jointly estimates the parameters sens, fpr, and
prev. prev is estimated from y, the number of positives and n, the number of tests, and it is
constrained by sens and fpr. sens is estimated as a probability for a binomial distribution that
generates the number of true positives, ntp, from the number of positive cases, npos. fpr is
similarly estimated from the number of known false positives nfp and the number of negative
cases, nneg. prevtest is the prevalence of the test set used to establish the sensitivity and sensitivity
of the detection algorithm. priorpos and priorneg are the prevalence given by the study rather than
estimated by the model. Finally, we assume we have no prior information about the three
parameters, sens and fpr, which are given flat priors from the Beta distribution.
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Once the model estimates sens, fpr, and prev we can calculate the positive predictive value
(ppv), or the probability of a positive test given that a subject is positive, as follows:

Similarly, we calculate the negative predictive value (npv, or the probability of a negative test
given the subject is negative).

Code and Supplementary Analysis
The R and Stan code along with the data used for the analysis and creating the tables and
figures are here: https://osf.io/rbe8p/?view_only=a1aa9b6553a4464ebe3761c56f3a0832.
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